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Constitutions, Constitutionalism and the Case of Modern China 
 
Albert H.Y. Chen∗ 
 
 
THE ideas and practices of written constitutions and constitutionalism that originated 
in the West in the 18th century were first imported into China in the late 19th century. 
There were three eras of constitution-making in modern Chinese history: the last 
decade of Qing imperial rule (1901-11), the republican era (1911-1949), and the 
communist era (1949-). Dr Sun Yat-sen, founding father of the Republic of China 
(RoC), developed a three-stage theory of the Chinese republic’s political 
development1 in which the last stage was to be constitutionalism (xianzheng). 
Although China in theory entered this last stage when the RoC Constitution of 1946 
was enacted, the civil and political rights in this Constitution became largely 
suspended as the RoC regime, upon its defeat by the Chinese Communists in the 
Chinese Civil War of the late 1940s, moved to Taiwan and proclaimed martial law. 
The establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the Mainland in 1949 
inaugurated a new era of constitution-making under the Soviet Union’s influence. 
However, even today, the discussion of “constitutionalism” (xianzheng) is still 
discouraged by the PRC regime,2 although the concepts of the (socialist) Rule of Law 
and human rights have been affirmed by constitutional amendments in 1999 and 2004 
respectively.3  
This chapter will first review the historical evolution of constitutions and 
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  This chapter draws on the following of the author’s previous works: ‘Pathways of Western liberal 
constitutional development in Asia: A comparative study of five major nations’ (2010) 8 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 849-884; ‘Constitutionalism and constitutional change in East and 
Southeast Asia: a historical and comparative overview’, in Albert H.Y. Chen and Tom Ginsburg (eds), 
Public Law in East Asia (Ashgate, 2013), xv-xlvii; ‘The achievement of constitutionalism in Asia: 
Moving beyond “constitutions without constitutionalism”’, in Albert H.Y. Chen (ed), Constitutionalism 
in Asia in the Early Twenty-First Century (Cambridge U Press, 2014), 1-31; ‘The discourse of political 
constitutionalism in contemporary China’ (2014) 14 (2) China Review 183-214; ‘Western 
constitutionalism in Southeast Asia: Some historical and comparative observations’, in Dirk Ehlers et al. 
(eds), Constitutionalism and Good Governance: Eastern and Western Perspectives (Nomos, 2014) 
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Asia’, in Christoph Antons (ed), Routledge Handbook of Asian Law (Routledge, 2017), 75-93.    
1 The three stages were military rule, “political tutelage” and “constitutional government” (xianzheng 
in Chinese, alternatively translated as “constitutionalism”). See n 57 below.  
2 See Rogier Creemers, ‘China’s Constitutionalism Debate: Content, Context and Implications’ (2015) 
74 China Journal 91-109; Thomas E. Kellogg, ‘Arguing Chinese constitutionalism: The 2013 
constitutional debate and the “urgency” of political reform’ (2016) 11 U.Pa. Asian L.Rev. 337-407; 
Lance L.P. Gore, ‘The Political Limits to Judicial Reform in China’ (2014) 2 Chinese Journal of 
Comparative Law 213-232, at 214-220.  
3 See Albert H.Y. Chen, An Introduction to the Legal System of the People’s Republic of China (Hong 
Kong: LexisNexis, 4th ed. 2011) 56-58. 
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constitutionalism in the modern world (part I), and consider possible typologies of 
constitutions and constitutionalism in the contemporary world (part II). It then 
introduces the historical and ideological contexts of constitutional developments in 
modern China, and describes the operation of the Chinese constitutional system (part 
III). Finally, it considers whether or to what extent, or what type (if any) of, 
constitutionalism is practised in contemporary China (part IV). 
 
I. The rise and globalization of constitutions and constitutionalism  
 The modern idea of a written “constitution”, meaning “a frame of political 
society, organized through and by the law, for the purpose of restraining arbitrary 
power”,4 was first well-developed in the course of the American and French 
Revolutions. The constitution has been conceived as a fundamental written law which 
simultaneously establishes the governmental system of a state and regulates the 
exercise of political power within the system. The constitution constitutes the state 
and its government; the government derives its legitimacy and authority from the 
constitution. The people of the nation-state are the makers of the constitution, acting 
directly or through their representatives in a constituent assembly. This is the theory 
of the constituent power, as distinguished from the government power which is 
constituted by the constitution. The exercise of the constituent power by the people is 
a manifestation of the sovereignty of the people, a fundamental concept that underlies 
most constitutions of modern times all over the world.5    
 In terms of their substantive content, modern constitutions can be understood as 
attempts by their draftsmen to design rationally a form of government that can best 
serve the objectives of the nation-state. The draftsmen of the first modern 
constitutions devised schemes of government for the purpose of minimizing the 
possibility of abuse of political power, tyranny or oppression, and maximizing the 
protection of political freedom and the individual’s rights to life, liberty and property. 
Hence principles and institutions such as the Rule of Law, separation of powers, 
checks and balances, parliamentary elections and judicial independence were written 
into constitutions. Bills of rights6 were also promulgated to provide for citizens’ 
rights and freedoms which governments must respect.   
 After the birth of the first modern constitutions in the USA and France, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Giovanni Sartori, ‘Constitutionalism: a preliminary discussion’ (1962) 56(4) American Political 
Science Review 853 at 860 (emphasis in original). 
5 See generally Dieter Grimm, ‘Types of constitutions’, in Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó (eds), 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford U Press, 2012) 98 at 101-105; Martin 
Loughlin, ‘What is constitutionalism?’ in Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin (eds), The Twilight of 
Constitutionalism (Oxford U Press, 2010) 47-72. 
6 Such as the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789) and the Bill of Rights 
inserted into the Constitution of the USA in 1791. 
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practice of constitution-making quickly spread throughout Europe in the course of the 
nineteenth century, and then all over the world in the course of the twentieth century. 
In today’s world, the possession of a constitution seems to have been accepted by all 
as a hallmark of the legitimacy of a nation-state and its regime for both domestic and 
external purposes. However, “once invented the constitution could be 
instrumentalized for purposes other than the original ones, adopted only in part or 
even as a mere form”.7     
 Unlike the earlier Western constitutions, the first constitutions adopted by 
regimes in the non-Western world were not enacted after a revolution in order to 
constitute a new state and a new political order, nor inspired by the liberal doctrine of 
the protection of individuals’ rights. Instead, such later constitutions were designed to 
bolster the legitimacy of regimes threatened by Western powers and to enhance the 
effectiveness of the former’s rule, although they did have the effect of modifying the 
existing political structure by introducing Western-style institutions such as 
parliaments and elections. Such constitutions are “politically enabling documents”:8 
instead of aiming at the limitation and control of government, they were promulgated 
by the existing regime to enable itself to be more legitimate and more effective, and 
thus more capable of survival when faced with domestic and external challenges. 
Examples include the Ottoman Empire’s constitution of 1876, the Egyptian 
constitution of 1882, and the constitution promulgated by the Meiji Emperor of Japan 
in 1889. As discussed below, the Qing Empire in China also attempted to move 
towards a constitutional monarchy in the early twentieth century, but was overthrown 
by the 1911 Revolution before the constitutional reforms could materialise.   
 The Meiji Constitution was modelled on the Prussian Constitution of 1850.9 
Although the movement of constitution-making engulfed European states – as well as 
the newly independent states in Latin America -- in the nineteenth century, there was 
not yet a uniform practice of enshrining citizens’ rights in constitutions, which were 
primarily documents defining the structure of government and the division of powers 
between various state organs. For example, neither the Bismarkian federal 
constitution of Germany enacted in 1871 nor the 1875 constitution of the Third 
Republic in France included a bill of rights.10 And constitutionalism in Europe in the 
nineteenth century suffered reversals and setbacks in the course of the twentieth 
century, with the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917 and the rise of Nazism and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Grimm, ‘Types of constitutions’ (n 5 above) at 105. 
8 Nathan J. Brown, ‘Regime reinventing themselves: Constitutional development in the Arab world’, 
in Saïd Amir Arjomand (ed.), Constitutionalism and Political Reconstruction (Leiden: Brill, 2007) 47 
at 49, 67. 
9 Hiroshi Oda, Japanese Law (London: Butterworths, 1992) 28. 
10 See the discussion in Karl Loewenstein, Political Power and the Governmental Process (U of 
Chicago Press, 1957) 142-3. 
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Fascism in Germany and Italy.  
 The terror and atrocities of the Second World War prompted deeper reflections 
on constitutionalism, what it requires and how it can be sustained. As a result, what 
has been termed the “post-War constitutional paradigm” came into existence,11 in 
which respect for human dignity and equality came to be recognised as the core value 
of the modern constitutional state. This paradigm was exemplified by the German 
Basic Law of 1949, which affirms the inviolability of human dignity, declares the 
basic principles of the liberal democratic order and the basic rights of individuals, and 
establishes a Federal Constitutional Court exercising the power of judicial review as 
guardian of the constitution and the “objective value order” affirmed by it.12   
 The end of the Second World War and the decolonization of Asia and Africa that 
followed gave rise to many new states in the international community. The exercise of 
constitution-making proved to be useful for the founders of the new states. 
Constitutions declared their newly acquired sovereignty and independence, and served 
as a symbol of nationhood and the unity and collective identity of the people of the 
new state. This wave of constitution-making is an illustration of “constitutional 
learning” at work.13  
In this process, the idea of a “constitution”, which indigenous leaders of the 
colonised peoples had learnt from the metropolitan powers, was now used to put an 
end to colonialism and to proclaim the independence, liberation and empowerment of 
a new political community. But the widespread adoption of the Western practice of 
constitution-making by newly independent states in Asia and Africa does not 
necessarily mean that the new constitutions were intended to serve the same functions 
and purposes as the first generation of Western constitutions or the contemporary 
“post-War constitutional paradigm” in the Western world, such as the legal limitation 
of state power, checks and balances among state organs, and the defence of citizens’ 
rights against the state. For political scientists and scholars of comparative 
constitutional law, therefore, the challenge is to understand and distinguish the 
different purposes or functions which constitutions have served,14 and the different 
kinds of constitutions or constitutionalism which have come into existence since the 
modern idea of the constitution was born in the late eighteenth century.   
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Lorraine E. Weinrib, ‘The postwar paradigm and American exceptionalism’, in Sujit Choudhry (ed.), 
The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (Cambridge U Press, 2006) 84-112.  
12 See Weinrib, ibid. 
13 For constitutional learning theory, see David S. Law and Mila Versteeg, ‘The evolution and 
ideology of global constitutionalism’ (2011) 99 (5) California Law Review 1163 at 1173-1175.  
14 See, e.g., the discussion of the functions of constitutions in Cheryl Saunders, ‘The impact of 
internationalisation on national constitutions’, in Albert H.Y. Chen (ed.), Constitutionalism in Asia in 
the Early Twenty-First Century (Cambridge U Press, 2014) 391 at 401-402; Tom Ginsburg and Alberto 
Simpser (eds), Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes (Cambridge U Press, 2014).   
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II. Typologies or classifications of constitutions and constitutionalism  
  
 In The Morality of Law,15 Lon Fuller describes the morality of law as a kind of 
“morality of aspiration”.16 Such a morality is concerned with the striving to achieve a 
particular good that can be realized in different degrees. The higher is the degree to 
which the good is achieved, the more successful and excellent is the moral project 
concerned. The project of law is the project of subjecting human conduct to the 
governance of legal rules. Fuller develops eight principles, which he calls the 
principles of the internal morality of law, as criteria for evaluating the success of this 
project. 
 The concept of the morality of law as a morality of aspiration may be usefully 
applied to understand the project of constitutionalism. Whereas Fuller conceives of 
the project of the rule of law as one to regulate human behaviour by legal norms, the 
project of constitutionalism seeks to subject rulers or government to the governance of 
constitutional and legal rules, to limit their powers and discretions by such rules, and 
to control and regulate the exercise of such powers and discretions by means of such 
rules. As in the case of the rule of law, constitutionalism may also be achieved to 
varying extents.  
The extent to which constitutionalism is achieved or practised in a particular 
state depends significantly on the extent to which the rulers, political leaders or 
power-holders in that state adopt what H.L.A. Hart17 calls the “internal point of view” 
towards the norms set out in the constitution (the “large-C” Constitution) and the 
constitutional law of the state (or what has been called “small-c” constitution or 
constitutional rules)18 – recognizing, accepting and “internalizing” such norms as 
rules of political behavior that they ought to comply with, and as public standards by 
which their words and deeds are to be judged, and, in cases of violations, may be 
criticized and subject to sanctions. Where officials and power-holders adopt such an 
internal point of view towards constitutional norms, it is likely that they will act and 
exercise powers in accordance with such norms, with the consequence that the 
constitution will be more fully implemented in practice and constitutionalism will be 
more fully achieved.    
 The practice of constitutionalism is not only a matter of degree; it may also be 
argued that there are different species or types of constitutionalism, 
“constitution[alism]”19 or political-legal practices relating to constitutions. These 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale U Press, rev. ed. 1969).  
16 Ibid., at 4. 
17 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press, 1961). 
18 David S. Law, ‘Constitutions’, in Peter Cane and Herbert Kritzer (eds), Oxford Handbook of 
Empirical Legal Research (Oxford U Press, 2010) 376 at 377.  
19 Wen-Chen Chang and David S. Law, ‘Chinese constitutionalism: an oxymoron?’, in Gary Jacobsohn 
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different species of constitutionalism have been shaped by different historical and 
ideological contexts and traditions, and may be regarded as adaptations of the original 
idea of constitutionalism to different societies and cultures and their circumstances 
and needs. Typologies or classifications of constitutions and constitutionalism, which 
we will now consider, can facilitate the study of different species of constitutionalism. 
We begin with the classic classifications of constitutions developed by Loewenstein 
and Sartori.    
Loewenstein and Sartori’s classifications of constitutions.  Loewenstein 
proposes an “ontological” approach to the classification of constitutions,20 which 
focuses on the degree to which political practice conforms to or relates to the norms 
set out in the constitution. In his theory, there are three types of constitutions: 
normative, nominal and semantic. A constitution is normative if it is “faithfully 
observed by all concerned” and is effective in “governing the dynamics of the power 
process”.21 A constitution is said to be nominal if it is “not lived up to in practice” – 
because of, for example, unfavourable “socioeconomic conditions”, but it serves an 
“educational” purpose and function, “with the goal, in the near or distant future, of 
becoming fully normative”.22 According to Loewenstein, this type of constitutions is 
often found in “states where western democratic constitutionalism has been implanted 
into a colonial or feudal-agrarian social order”.23 The semantic constitution, which in 
Lowenstein’s view was exemplified by that of the former Soviet Union, does provide 
information about the political and legal systems, but is no more than an instrument of 
political control and “the formalization of the existing location of political power”. 
“The peaceful, non-revolutionary change in the location of political power is 
impossible.”24  
 Sartori also developed a threefold classification of constitutions,25 but the 
terms he used and their meaning are slightly different from Loewenstein’s. In 
Sartori’s theory, the three types of constitution are the “garantiste constitution”, the 
“nominal constitution”, and the “façade constitution (or fake constitution)”. The 
garantiste constitution secures civil liberties, restricts arbitrary power and ensures a 
limited government.26 It is therefore equivalent to Loewenstein’s normative 
constitution. Satori’s nominal constitution is, as Satori himself acknowledges, the 
same as Loewenstein’s semantic constitution. It is a “collection of rules which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and Miguel Schor (eds), Comparative Constitutional Theory (Edward Elgar, forthcoming), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2971724 (May 21, 2017) at 8. 
20 Loewenstein, Political Power (n 10 above).  
21 Ibid., at 148-149. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., at 151. 
24 Ibid., at 149-150. 
25 Sartori, ‘Constitutionalism’ (n 4 above). 
26 Ibid., at 854-855. 
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organize but do not restrain the exercise of political power”.27 The main discrepancy 
between Satori’s scheme and Loewenstein’s lies in Sartori’s concept of the façade 
constitution, which “give[s] us no reliable information about the real governmental 
process” and is “basically a disguise”.28 Façade constitutions “take the appearance of 
‘true constitutions’”, but “are disregarded (at least in their essential garantiste 
features)”. “As far as the techniques of liberty and the rights of the power addressees 
are concerned, they are a dead letter.”29 Sartori considered his concept of the façade 
constitution to be different from Loewenstein’s nominal constitution, which (in 
Loewenstein’s view) is intended to become fully normative at some future point in 
time. Sartori also pointed out that there is “often a considerable overlapping between 
nominal and façade constitutions”, thus giving rise to “ a ‘mixed type’ (partly nominal 
and partly fake) of pseudo-constitution”.30  
The typologies or classifications of constitutions developed by Loewenstein and 
Sartori may be correlated with the typology or classification of political regimes 
developed by political scientists. We now review the latter typology and then explore 
the correlation between the latter and the former typologies.  
 Types of political regimes.  Political regimes in the contemporary world may be 
classified as democratic, non-democratic (or authoritarian), and hybrid regimes 
(which have both democratic and authoritarian elements).31 Hybrid regimes are also 
known as semi-authoritarian regimes32 or semidemocracy.33  
The key feature of semi-authoritarianism, as in the cases of Eygpt under 
Mubarak and Venezuela under Chávez, is that although there exist opposition political 
parties and elections, there is “little real competition for power”,34 because there are 
“mechanisms that effectively prevent the transfer of power through elections from the 
hands of the incumbent leaders or party to a new political elite or organization”.35 
Semi-authoritarianism usually relies on “power networks independent of the formal 
democratic processes and institutions”.36 The latter are often weak and manipulated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Ibid., at 861. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid.  
31 See, e.g., Larry Diamond, ‘Thinking about hybrid regimes’ (2002) 13(2) Journal of Democracy 21. 
Several species of hybrid regimes have been identified, including “semidemocracy”, the “hegemonic 
party system”, and “pseudodemocracy”: see L. Diamond, J.J. Linz and S.M. Lipset (eds), Politics in 
Developing Countries (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1990), at 7-8.  
32 Marina Ottaway, Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism (Washington, D.C.: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003). 
33 William Case, ‘Can the “halfway house” stand? Semidemocracy and elite theory in three Southeast 
Asian countries’ (1996) 28(4) Comparative Politics 437; William Case, Politics in Southeast Asia 
(Richmond: Curzon, 2002).  
34 Ottaway, Democracy Challenged (n 32 above) 3. 
35 Ibid., at 15. 
36 Ibid., at 134. 
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by the rulers.37 There is thus a “discrepancy between the way in which power is 
generated and allocated in practice and the way in which it ought to be generated and 
allocated according to the formal institutional framework”.38  
The concept of semi-authoritarianism overlaps considerably with that of 
“semidemocracy”, which has been used to study the politics of Singapore and 
Malaysia.39 Semidemocracy is characterized by “electoral contestation” without 
“liberal participation”.40 Restrictions on civil liberties and on the opposition’s 
activities are such that the opposition would not be able to win power in an election, 
which is no more than a “visible outlet for social grievances”.41 
The key distinction between a hybrid regime and a full democracy is that in 
the former case, although different political parties are allowed to exist and regular 
elections are held, the possibility of different political parties taking turns to form the 
government after winning a general election is largely or completely ruled out in 
practice. The monopoly of power by the ruling elite, or the practical impossibility of 
transfer of power to a different political party or group, is secured by restrictions on 
civil and political liberties, persecution of and coercion against opposition politicians 
(for example, by means of repressive laws or selective enforcement of the law), 
informal power networks (including those based on a culture of patrimonialism, 
patronage and clientalism), practices inconsistent with free and fair elections 
(including vote-buying, rigging the election), etc. On the other hand, the difference 
between a hybrid regime and a completely authoritarian one is that in the latter case, 
there exist minimal or no civil and political liberties, little or no space for political and 
social pluralism (such as political parties other than the ruling party, and civil society 
organizations outside the control of the regime), and elections (if they exist) are 
merely those in which there are no candidates who are not from or approved by the 
ruling party.   
Correlation between regime types and types of constitutions. The differences 
between democratic, authoritarian and hybrid regimes as discussed above have 
important implications for their constitutions and constitutional practice. The types of 
constitutions as formulated by Loewenstein and Sartori may be mapped onto the types 
of regimes as follows. Democratic regimes that are governed by liberal-democratic 
constitutions have normative or garantiste constitutions. Such constitutions may also 
operate to varying degrees in democracies that are fragile, unstable, unconsolidated or 
of poor quality.42 On the other hand, transitional or new democratic regimes which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Ibid., at 16-17. 
38 Ibid., at 16. 
39 See n 33 above. 
40 Case, ‘Can the “halfway house” stand?’ (n 33 above), 439. 
41 Ibid.  
42 For the “quality” of democracy, see generally Leonardo Morlino, Changes for Democracy (Oxford 
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have enacted liberal-democratic constitutions and are aspiring towards the full 
practice of democracy may have nominal constitutions in Loewenstein’s sense. 
Authoritarian and hybrid regimes which have constitutions that are textually 
liberal-democratic are likely to have what Sartori calls a façade constitution or 
pseudo-constitution. Authoritarian or totalitarian regimes of the Marxist-Leninist type, 
in which the leadership of the communist party is prescribed by the constitution which 
also rejects multi-party competitive elections, may be said to have semantic 
constitutions (in Loewenstein’s sense) or nominal constitutions (in Sartori’s sense).  
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Table 1: Types of regimes and constitutions 
Types of regimes Types of constitutions 
Democratic Normative (Loewenstein) or Garantiste (Sartori) 
Transitional (towards democracy) Nominal (Loewenstein) 
Hybrid Façade (Sartori) or Pseudo-constitution (Sartori) 
Authoritarian Façade (Sartori) or Pseudo-constitution (Sartori) 
Authoritarian (communist) Semantic (Loewenstein) or Nominal (Sartori) 
Totalitarian (communist) Semantic (Loewenstein) or Nominal (Sartori) 
 
A three-fold classification.  An alternative approach to the classification of 
constitutions and of political, constitutional and legal practices relating to 
constitutions is the following three-fold classification which is closely related to the 
classification of regime types:43 (a) constitutionalism in its classical sense or liberal 
constitutionalism; (b) the Marxist-Leninist mode of governance by a communist 
party-state legitimized by a written constitution, or communist/socialist constitutional 
practice; and (c) hybrid constitutionalism, “practised in states in which both elements 
of liberal constitutionalism and authoritarian elements that subvert or are inconsistent 
with such constitutionalism exist”.44 The three categories may be elaborated as 
follows.  
(a) Liberal constitutionalism is the original form of constitutionalism as it first 
emerged in modern Western history.45 This includes elements such as (1) the 
Rule of Law, (2) the separation of powers, (3) political checks and balances, (4) 
civil liberties and human rights, (5) a written constitution which operates as a 
normative constitution (as mentioned above), (6) judicial review of the 
constitutionality of governmental and legislative acts, and (7) peaceful transfer 
of political power in accordance with constitutional norms. In the 
contemporary world, this kind of constitutionalism is basically co-extensive 
with liberal democracy, although the first constitutional states in Western 
history were not yet fully democratic.   
(b) Communist/socialist constitutional practice is a form of totalitarian or 
authoritarian rule by a communist Party-State legitimized by a written 
constitution defining the structure of the state and declaring the rights of 
citizens. It may be doubted whether it is a genuine form of constitutionalism, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Chen, ‘Pathways of Western liberal constitutional development in Asia’ (author’s note * on the first 
page of this chapter) at 880; Chen, ‘Constitutionalism and constitutional change in East and Southeast 
Asia’ (also author’s note * above) at xvi-xvii.  
44 Chen, ‘Constitutionalism and constitutional change’ (ibid.), at xvii. 




as the power of the communist party may not be subject to such a degree of 
constitutional and legal restraint that deserves to be called constitutionalism. 
Hence the term “communist/socialist constitutional practice” rather than 
“communist/socialist constitutionalism”. Whether China in the post-Mao era 
of economic and legal reforms is moving towards some form of 
constitutionalism that deserves to be called “communist/socialist 
constitutionalism” or “party-state constitutionalism” will be discussed below.  
(c) Hybrid constitutionalism is a concept analogous to that of “hybrid regimes” as 
discussed above. It is practised in states with constitutions that are textually 
liberal-democratic, in which there exist authoritarian practices that are 
inconsistent with liberal constitutionalism. Such authoritarian practices may be 
derived from traditional or indigenous notions, norms, institutions and 
practices of politics, culture and religion (as in theocracy), or constitute 
deliberate attempts by rulers or ruling elites (such as a one-man dictatorship, 
one-party hegemony, military regime or theocracy) to practise authoritarian 
rule behind a façade of liberal-democratic constitutional forms. They may do 
so by, for example, determining who may participate in elections, 
manipulating or rigging electoral and other constitutional processes, violating 
human rights guaranteed by the constitution, or otherwise denying opposition 
forces fair opportunities to compete for political power on a level playing 
ground in accordance with the constitution. This concept of hybrid 
constitutionalism overlaps with or embraces several other types of 
constitutionalism theorised by contemporary scholars, such as “authoritarian 
constitutionalism”, 46  “communitarian constitutionalism”, 47  and “theocratic 
constitutionalism”.48  
 
This three-fold scheme of classification may be mapped onto Loewenstein’s and 
Sartori’s schemes as follows. Liberal constitutionalism corresponds to Loewenstein’s 
“normative constitution” or Sartori’s “garantiste constitution”. Communist/socialist 
constitutional practice would be partly based on what Loewenstein calls a “semantic 
constitution” or what Sartori calls a “nominal constitution”, and partly on Sartori’s 
“façade constitutions” and “mixed type of pseudo-constitution”. And hybrid 
constitutionalism would be some kind of mixture (in different proportions, thus giving 
rise to different versions of hybrid constitutionalism, some closer to liberal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Mark Tushnet, ‘Authoritarian constitutionalism’ (2015) 100 Cornell L.Rev. 391; Tom Ginsburg and 
Alberto Simpser (eds), Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes (Cambridge U Press, 2014).   
47 Li-ann Thio, ‘Constitutionalism in illiberal polities’, in Rosenfeld and Sajó (eds), Oxford Handbook 
of Comparative Constitutional Law (n 5 above) 133 at 142-147. 
48 Thio, ibid., at 138-142; Larry C. Backer, ‘God(s) over constitutions: International and religious 
transnational constitutionalism in the 21st century’ (2007) 27 Mississippi College L.Rev. 11. 
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constitionalism and some further away from it) of certain characteristics of each of the 
three types of constitutions in either Loewenstein’s typology or Sartori’s. The 
following chart shows the correlation between the three species of constitutionalism 
and the types of constitutions as formulated by Lowenstein and Sartori: 
 
Table 2: Types of constitutions and constitutionalism 
Types of 
        constitutions 
 
 

















Liberal constitutionalism   √ 
Communist/socialist 
constitutional practice 
√           √  
Hybrid constitutionalism √           √           √ 
 
A multi-dimensional model to “pluralize” the concept of “constitution[alism]”. 
Whereas the above typologies of constitutions and constitutionalism focus primarily 
on the relationship between constitutional text and practice, the manner in which the 
constitution is implemented, and the nature of the political regime in which the 
constitution operates, another possible approach to the comparative study of 
constitutions or constitutionalism is to “ ‘pluraliz[e]’ the concept of constitution[alism] 
into categories or subtypes with criteria of varying thickness”.49 In this theory, the 
word “constitution[alism]” is used because “ ‘constitution’ and ‘constitutionalism’ are 
merely semantic variants of the same concept”.50 According to this theory, three 
types of criteria may be applied in defining the concept of “constitution[alism]”, each 
of which may be applied either strictly or leniently. The three types of criteria relate 
respectively to “the stated goals or aspirations” of the regime, “the formal or 
institutional characteristics of the regime”, and the regime’s “real-world 
performance”.51 Thus the assessment of whether “constitution[alism]” exists or the 
extent to which “constitution[alism]’ is practised in a particular country depends on 
which of the above types of criteria are used, and also on whether the criteria are 
applied strictly or leniently. “There is no scholarly consensus capable of supplying us 
with a single correct definition of constitution[alism]. For better or for worse, scholars 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Chang and Law, ‘Chinese constitutionalism’ (n 19 above) at 9. 
50 Ibid., at 7. 
51 Ibid., at 9-12. 
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have implicitly or explicitly employed definitions of constitution[alism] that 




III.  Constitutional developments in modern China  
	  
From imperial to republican era.  During the last decade of its dynastic rule in 
China, the Qing court began to move towards a constitutional monarchy.53 An 
“Imperial Constitutional Outline” was promulgated in 1908, and provincial 
assemblies and a provisional national assembly were elected.54 The 1911 Revolution 
overthrew the Qing Empire, and the Republic of China (RoC) was established in 1912 
with a liberal democratic “provisional constitution”.55 This constitution exemplifies 
what Loewenstein calls the “nominal constitution” – a constitution whose makers 
intend to implement but fails to be put into practice because of unfavourable political 
and socioeconomic conditions.  
In the first one and a half decade of the republican era, several constitutions were 
promulgated or drafted by successive governments in Beijing, but none was effective 
as China was beset with warlordism and civil strife.56 In 1928, the Kuomintang 
(KMT, or Chinese Nationalist Party) under Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership succeeded 
to unify large parts of China (but not areas under the control of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP)) and established a new RoC government in Nanjing. The 
KMT adhered to the strategy of constitutional development advocated by its founder, 
Dr Sun Yat-sen, who developed a three-stage programme for China’s political 
transformation.57 The first stage was military government (junzheng) for the purpose 
of ending warlordism and unifying the country by military force. The second was 
preparation for constitutional democracy under the KMT’s political tutelage 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Ibid., at 13. 
53 Xiaohong Xiao-Planes, ‘Of constitutions and constitutionalism: Trying to build a new political order 
in China, 1908-1949’, in Stéphanie Balme and Michael W. Dowdle (eds), Building Constitutionalism 
in China (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) 37-57.  
54 Xiaohong Xiao-Plane, ‘The first democratic experiment in China (1908-1914): Chinese tradition and 
local elite practices’, in M. D.-M. and P.-É. Will, China, Democracy, and Law: A Historical and 
Contemporary Approach, transl. by N. Norberg (Leiden: Brill, 2012) 227-256. 
55 See generally Wei-tung Pan, The Chinese Constitution: A Study of Forty Years of 
Constitution-making in China (Westport, Connecticut: Hyperion Press, reprint ed. 1983, orig. pub. 
1945).  
56 See generally Pan (ibid.); Andrew Nathan, Peking Politics, 1918-1923: Factionalism and the 
Failure of Constitutionalism (University of California Press, 1976).  
57 See generally Sheng Wang, The Thought of Dr Sun Yat-sen (Taipei: Li Ming Cultural Enterprise, 
1981); Audrey Wells, The Political Thought of Sun Yat-sen: Development and Impact (Palgrave, 2001); 
C. C. Tan, Chinese Political Thought in the Twentieth Century (Newton Abbot, Devon: David & 
Charles, 1972).  
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(xunzheng). The third and final stage would be constitutional government (xianzheng). 
Using our terminology, this may be understood as a theory about establishing “hybrid 
constitutionalism” first and then moving towards liberal constitutionalism. A 
provisional constitution for the period of “political tutelage” was promulgated by 
Chiang’s government in 1931. This was known as the Constitution of the RoC in the 
Period of Political Tutelage (Zhonghua minguo xunzheng shiqi yuefa); it expressly 
vested political power in the KMT.58 
After the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1945 and before civil war soon 
erupted again between the KMT and the CCP, a new Constitution of the RoC was 
adopted by a constituent assembly convened by Chiang’s government in December 
1946.59 The original purpose of the making of this Constitution was to move China 
from the stage of political tutelage by the KMT to full liberal constitutional 
democracy with a constitutional government based on the separation of powers, 
elected by free multi-party election and respectful of civil liberties and human rights. 
The 1946 Constitution exhibits all key ingredients of a liberal democracy, and 
establishes a constitutional court (consisting of the Grand Justices of the Judicial 
Yuan). The constitution contains provisions on horizontal and vertical separation of 
powers, checks and balances, free elections and the guarantee of human rights. 
However, the constitution was never fully implemented in China as a result of the 
following events. As China descended into a state of civil war, the KMT-led National 
Assembly in April 1948 introduced a constitutional amendment known as the 
“Temporary Provisions for the Period of National Mobilization to Suppress the 
Communist Rebellion” which expanded the emergency powers of the President. 
Jieyan (which may be translated as a state of siege or martial law) was decreed by the 
KMT government in December 1948 in mainland China and in May 1949 in Taiwan 
(which had been ceded by the Qing Empire to Japan in 1895 and liberated from 
Japanese rule in 1945). After its defeat by the Communist forces in the mainland, the 
KMT government retreated to Taiwan in 1949.60  
The civil liberties and democratic elections promised by the 1946 Constitution 
were largely suspended by the RoC regime in Taiwan for nearly four decades,61 until 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 See Pan, The Chinese Constitution (note 55 above) 48-50, 247-255.  
59 See generally Xiao-Planes, ‘Of constitutions and constitutionalism’ (n 53 above); Jing Jiren, 
Zhongguo lixian shi (History of Chinese Constitutionalism) (Taipei: Lianjing, 1984), chap. 16; 
Tuan-sheng Ch’ien, The Government and Politics of China 1912-1949 (Harvard U Press, 1950).    
60 On the history of Taiwan, see generally Murray A. Rubinstein (ed), Taiwan: A New History 
(Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999); John F. Copper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 3rd ed. 1999); Denny Roy, Taiwan: A Political History (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2003).  
61	   See generally Hungdah Chiu, ‘Constitutional Development in the Republic of China in Taiwan’, in 
Steve Tsang (ed), In the Shadow of China: Political Developments in Taiwan Since 1949 (Hong Kong 
University Press, 1993), chap. 1; Chi-tung Lin and Herbert H.P. Ma, ‘The Republic of China (Taiwan)’, 
in Lawrence W. Beer (ed.), Constitutional Systems in Late Twentieth Century Asia (Seattle: University 
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the liberalisation and democratization of the regime that began with the lifting of 
martial law in 1987.62 The case of Taiwan thus exemplifies a transition from hybrid 
constitutionalism to liberal constitutionalism.  
The PRC Constitution.  After defeating the KMT forces, the CCP under Mao 
Zedong’s leadership established the new People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 
October 1949.63 In the first few years of the new regime, China was governed by a 
provisional constitution known as the “Common Programme of the Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference”. The first constitution of the PRC was adopted by 
a new National People’s Congress in 1954.64 This constitution was to a considerable 
extent modeled on the 1936 Constitution of the U.S.S.R.,65 although the ROC 
Constitution was included among the reference materials compiled for some of those 
involved in the drafting exercise.66 
The second constitution was enacted in 1975 when the PRC was under the 
“ultra-leftist” rule that began with the launch of the “Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution” in 1966. This constitution codified the ideology of the Cultural 
Revolution era. The “Cultural Revolution” was a mass movement instigated by Mao 
Zedong to purge those considered to be “capitalist roaders” in the CCP and other 
“class enemies” in Chinese society. Ideologically indoctrinated by the personality cult 
of Mao, young “Red Guards” resorted to large-scale violence and terror in “struggling 
against” officials, intellectuals and ordinary people accused of being 
counter-revolutionaries.67  
The third constitution, introduced two years after Mao’s death in 1976, marked 
the beginnings of the retreat from Maoism and the new orientation of “socialist 
modernization”. The fourth constitution, which (subject to several amendments) is 
still in force today, was enacted in 1982. It laid the ideological, institutional and legal 
foundations for Deng Xiaoping’s era of “reform and opening”, and has served as the 
constitutional embodiment of Deng’s doctrine of “socialism with Chinese 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of Washington Press, 1992) 88.  
62	   See generally Linda Chao and Ramon H. Myers, The First Chinese Democracy: Political Life in the 
Republic of China on Taiwan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U Press, 1998).   
63 On the history of the PRC, see, e.g., John K. Fairbank, The Great Chinese Revolution 1800-1975 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1987); Immanuel C.Y. Hsü, The Rise of Modern China (Oxford U Press, 
2000); Jonathan Fenby, The Penguin History of Modern China (London: Allen Lane, 2008). 
64 See Glenn D. Tiffert, ‘Epistrophy: Chinese constitutionalism and the 1950s’, in Balme and Dowdle 
(eds), Building Constitutionalism in China (n 53 above) 59-76. On the constitutional history of the PRC, 
see Xu Chongde, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa shi (Constitutional History of the People’s 
Republic of China) (Fuzhou: Fujian People’s Press, 2003).  
65  Albert H.Y. Chen, ‘Socialist Law, Civil Law, Common Law, and the Classification of 
Contemporary Chinese Law’, in J.M. Otto et al. (eds), Law-Making in the People’s Republic of China 
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000) 55, at 57.  
66 Cai Dingjian, Xianfa jingjie (Commentary on the Constitution) (Beijing: Law Press, 2nd ed. 2006) 
33. 
67 Yu-Shan Wu, ‘China’, in Jeffrey Kopstein et al. (eds), Comparative Politics (Cambridge U Press, 




 The 1982 Constitution was drafted using the 1954 Constitution as the baseline, 
and sought to improve upon it. The “Four Cardinal Principles” advocated by Deng 
Xiaoping were often referred to as forming key ingredients of the guiding ideology 
behind the 1982 Constitution.68 Deng had stated that adherence to these four 
principles was essential for the purpose of pursuing China’s economic 
modernization.69 The four principles are insisting on the socialist path, insisting on 
the people’s democratic dictatorship, insisting on the CCP’s leadership, and insisting 
on Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought (subsequently revised to include Deng 
Xiaoping Theory and the idea of the “three represents”70). These principles may be 
discerned from a passage in the Preamble to the 1982 Constitution.71  
Article 1 of the PRC Constitution states that “The PRC is a socialist state under 
the people’s democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the 
alliance of workers and peasants. The socialist system is the basic system of the PRC.” 
“People’s democratic dictatorship” is a term coined by Mao Zedong for the purpose of 
the indigenous application of the Marxist concept of “proletarian dictatorship” which 
is to be practised after the socialist revolution overthrowing capitalism.72 The 
leadership of the working class mentioned in article 1 of the Constitution is an 
implicit reference to the leadership of the CCP, as under the Leninist theory of the 
communist party, this party consists of the vanguard of the proletariat (i.e. the 
working class) and shall exercise leadership on behalf of the proletariat in building the 
socialist society.73  
After the 1982 Constitution was enacted, four sets of amendments to it have been 
introduced, in 1988, 1993, 1999 and 2004 respectively. The amendments reflect the 
deepening and strengthening of the policy of “reform and opening”, and include, for 
example, the introduction of the following terms and concepts into the Constitution: 
the preliminary stage of socialism, socialism with Chinese characteristics, the socialist 
market economy, protecting the private sector of the economy, ruling the country 
according to law and building a socialist Rechtsstaat (fazhiguojia in Chinese, or a 
State based on the Rule of Law), and protecting human rights and private property 
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69 Cai (ibid.) at 73.  
70 Chen, Introduction (n 3 above) at 57-58; Larry C. Backer, ‘The rule of law, the Chinese Communist 
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The operation of the Chinese constitutional system.  Since the Dengist era of 
“reform and opening” began in the late 1970s, China has moved a long way from a 
totalitarian communist system in which the Party-State controlled all social, economic 
and cultural domains and all aspects of citizens’ lives, to an authoritarian political 
system that has committed itself to certain standards of legality74 and has fostered the 
development of a vibrant “socialist market economy” or “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics” (or what some outside observers have called “capitalism with Chinese 
characteristics”75). The economic reform has sustained the rapid growth of domains of 
private and economic life outside the direct control of the Party-State.76  
According to the Constitution, the “supreme organ of state power”77 in the PRC 
is the National People’s Congress, which is elected by provincial people’s congresses, 
which in turn are elected by municipal people’s congresses. The municipal people’s 
congresses are elected by county-level people’s congresses which are directly elected 
by the people. In practice, candidates for elections to people’s congresses are largely 
determined by CCP organs, and the National People’s Congress is largely a 
rubber-stamp body under the leadership of the CCP.78  
 In the PRC, the principal means by which the Constitution is implemented is the 
making and enforcement of laws in accordance with the Constitution.79 There has 
been “constitutional evolution through legislation”, particularly in the domains of 
“vertical and horizontal governmental relations” and “interregional relations”.80 It has 
been suggested that “China’s top legislature has routinely engaged in interpreting the 
Constitution during the legislative process, and has already accumulated a rich body 
of constitutional norms.”81 There has been considerable “moderate constitutional 
reform of the small-c variety [i.e. “small-c” constitutional rules as distinguished from 
the “large-C” Constitution], in the form of statutory enactments and administrative 
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78 See generally Jiang Jinsong, The National People’s Congress of China (Beijing: Foreign Languages 
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practice.”82 The growth of the institutional capacity and strength of the people’s 
congress system,83 and the development and regularization of norms in China’s 
“unwritten constitution”84 (such as unwritten norms governing age of retirement and 
maximum terms of office of Party leaders, their relationship with State institutions, or 
the mode of collective leadership at the top level of the Party85), suggest that there has 
been a trend towards the formalization and constitutionalization of political life in 
China. 
In the era of “reform and opening”, the court system has developed rapidly in 
terms of size, caseload and the educational qualifications and professionalisation of 
judges,86 but it has also been beset with problems of corruption, political interference 
in judicial decision-making and failure to enforce court judgments in civil cases.87 
The constitutional function of the Chinese courts is to try cases in accordance with the 
law.88 They have no role to play in interpreting the Constitution and reviewing the 
constitutionality of legal norms and of administrative actions,89 although they do 
exercise the power of judicial review of the legality of administrative actions.90 In 
2001, the Supreme People’s Court’s interpretation in the much publicized Qi Yuling 
case seemed to suggest that Chinese courts may apply constitutional provisions 
directly in adjudicating cases,91 but the repeal by the Supreme People’s Court itself of 
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this interpretation in December 200892 has signaled that courts are not permitted to 
interpret or enforce provisions of the Constitution in their adjudicative work.  
The limited or negligible role play by courts in the development of Chinese 
constitutional law should not however be taken to mean that the Chinese constitution 
is of no significance. For instance, the Sun Zhigang incident of 2003 and subsequent 
developments in weiquan (“rights defence”) movements in Chinese civil society 
suggest that the concepts, principles and rights enshrined in the Chinese constitution 
have been increasingly used by litigants, activists and aggrieved persons, in litigation, 
social movements as well as public discourse, to fight for justice and for the 
protection of their constitutional rights against violations by authorities.93 This may 
been termed the development of “popular constitutionalism”94 or “societal 
constitutionalism”.95 In the first decade of this century, some “constitutional 
entrepreneurs” in China have successfully mobilized public opinion and made an 
impact on legal and policy developments by relying on constitutional norms.96 Thus 
it seems that the PRC Constitution is not merely a “sham constitution – in the sense of 
a constitution that is simply irrelevant and ignored”.97 The Constitution might be able 
to “serve as a constructive irritant” to the regime,98 in the sense that “it cannot easily 
be expelled from the system but instead creates space for a normatively privileged 
form of discourse that cannot easily be ignored.”99 
Understanding the Chinese constitution. There is probably a consensus among 
both Chinese and Western scholars of Chinese constitutional law that in order to 
understand the operation of the Chinese political and constitutional system, one must 
look beyond the state organs prescribed by the PRC Constitution, and examine the 
role of the CCP in the system and the practical operation of the oft-cited principle of 
Party leadership. Insofar as the CCP and its organization is governed by its own 
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constitution, which is known as the Charter (dangzhang) of the CCP, the PRC may be 
said to have a “dual constitution” consisting of the PRC Constitution and the CCP 
Charter.100 A leading scholar of the “political constitutionalism” school101 in 
contemporary China has stressed that the principle of Party leadership is actually the 
foremost fundamental law of the Chinese constitution.102 In this context, the Chinese 
constitution must be taken to mean the constitutional law consisting of both the 
large-C Constitution and small-c constitutional norms, as the principle of Party 
leadership of State organs (such as the National People’s Congress and local people’s 
congresses, the Central People’s Government and local people’s governments, courts, 
procuratorates, etc.) has not been expressly or precisely written into any article of the 
current Constitution, and is only touched upon in its Preamble. Though not given 
formal constitutional status by the PRC Constitution, the principle of Party leadership 
is definitely a core element of China’s “living constitution” in today.103 
The concept of “dual constitution” mentioned above has been employed to 
describe the nature of the Chinese constitutional system and how it has developed in 
the post-Mao era. It has been suggested that the legal, political and constitutional 
reforms in China in the last few decades have led to the emergence of a “dual 
constitution comprising the Party and the State”.104 In this dual constitutional 
framework, there are in effect two sovereign bodies, the CCP and the National 
People’s Congress (NPC).105 The NPC is the repository of constitutional 
legitimacy,106 because it is elected by the people in accordance with the PRC 
Constitution and therefore represents the people. “Through the NPC, the Party sought 
to integrate the polity and to organise it around the principle of one-party rule. The 
role of the CPC’s [CCP] control over the NPC is crucial since deputies give voluntary 
assent and support to the CPC”.107 It is pointed out that the CCP itself “realised that 
the strengthening of the People’s Congress System may be a threat to it if not handled 
properly.”108 “Ironically, the development of the People’s Congress System has 
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become a thorn in the CPC’s side, which cannot be readily removed”.109 
The dual constitution is the outcome of the co-evolution of the State system and 
of the Party system “interdependently” in the last few decades.110 On the one hand, 
the State system consisting of the People’s Congresses at national and local levels, the 
people’s governments, the courts, etc. have been strengthened and given more 
autonomy in the exercise of their constitutional powers.111 In particular, local 
people’s congresses have become more active in exercising supervision over local 
governments, and on a few occasions they have refused to rubber-stamp Government 
reports or the Party’s nominees for government positions. The court system has also 
been strengthened by a series of judicial reforms and the policy of “ruling the country 
according to law”.112 On the other hand, the Party has “integrate[d] itself into the 
State through political conventions and self-normalisation”.113 For example, there is 
deliberately engineered overlapping membership of the leadership State and Party 
organs.114 Intra-party rules and regulations have been introduced to regulate the 
internal operation of the Party.115 
 
IV. Is China practising or on the way to the practice of constitutionalism  
 
 Although China today is still ruled by a communist party that monopolizes 
political power and does not permit the multi-party elections that take place in states 
which practise hybrid or liberal constitutionalism, it has successfully pursued 
market-oriented economic reforms since the 1980s, opened up Chinese society to 
Western and global influences, and moved from totalitarianism to some form of 
authoritarianism. It has in recent decades introduced constitutional revisions and legal 
reforms, including constitutional recognition of socialist legality or socialist Rule of 
Law, human rights and private property rights. It has made substantial progress in the 
construction of a socialist legal system in which detailed laws govern most domains of 
economic and social activities; State organs and officials are required to exercise their 
powers in accordance with the law; and systems of courts, procuratorates, lawyers and 
legal education have been built up for the purpose of operating the legal system 
effectively.116   
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 Despite bold calls for liberal-democratic constitutional reforms by small numbers 
of intellectuals, such as the signatories of “Charter 08” of 2008 in China (led by Liu 
Xiaobo (1955-2017) who was convicted and jailed as a result but also awarded a 
Nobel Peace Prize in 2010),117 the Party-State has firmly resisted any political reform 
that might weaken or threaten the Communist Party’s monopoly of state power. 
Although human rights are now enshrined in the Constitution, the courts have no role 
to play in constitutional adjudication as mentioned above. According to the 
classification schemes developed by Loewenstein and Sartori discussed above, the 
constitution of the PRC is apparently a “semantic constitution” (Loewenstein’s term) 
or “nominal constitutions” (Sartori’s term) in the sense that it reflects the allocation of 
power (including the structure of State organs and the principle of the leadership of 
the communist party) but does not effectively constrain its exercise. 
However, given the regime’s normative commitment to the Rule of Law and 
reasonable records in making laws and developing legal institutions in the last four 
decades,118 it may be doubted whether the concepts of “semantic” or “nominal” 
constitutions are completely adequate in describing and analyzing the nature and 
character of political-constitutional-legal practice in contemporary China. The 
question thus arises as to whether China’s evolving constitutional practice may be 
said to constitute a distinctive species of constitutionalism, such as “party-state 
constitutionalism”, alternatively known as “state-party constitutionalism”. 
State-party constitutionalism in China?  The theory of “state-party 
constitutionalism”119 is premised on a broad understanding of constitutionalism 
which is not limited to liberal constitutionalism. “Constitutionalism is grounded on 
the fundamental postulate of rule of law”, which “avoid[s] tyranny or despotism by 
grounding state action in law and by limiting the reach of such lawful state action on 
the basis of values reflecting the values of the political collective”.120 Depending on 
the content of the “legitimating value system” in the state concerned, 
constitutionalism may take the form of “nationalist constitutionalism”, “transnational 
constitutionalism”, “theocratic constitutionalism”, “natural law constitutionalism”, etc. 
“[T]hey all share equally in the commitment to the fundamental values of a 
constitutional order – a rule of law based governance structure grounded in limits on 
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state power and popular accountability based on law.” 121 
 The theory of state-party constitutionalism as applied to contemporary China 
takes as its point of departure the idea that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is 
constitutionally entrenched as the “party in power”.122 Unlike political parties in 
liberal-democratic systems, the CCP is not merely one among several political parties, 
but is an integral and vital part of the state’s constitutional, political and legal systems. 
Thus the real constitution of the PRC includes not only the Constitution of the PRC 
state, but also the constitution or Charter of the CCP.123 Insofar as the CCP promotes 
the Rule of Law, subordinates itself to the Rule of Law and engages in “self 
discipline”124 for this purpose, and insofar as there is some form of “separation of 
powers”125 -- between the CCP (as the source of the values and fundamental policies 
that guide the government126) and the state organs (which engage in concrete 
administrative tasks), constitutionalism can be said to be practised in China. Such 
“state-party constitutionalism” is said to be a kind of “constitutionalism with Chinese 
characteristics”.127   
This theory admits that in this kind of constitutionalism, not all citizens have 
“political citizenship” and exercise political rights, although all of them have 
“economic and social citizenship” and exercise economic and social rights.128 
Political citizenship in China, according to this theory, is confined to members of the 
CCP, whose membership is open to everyone who subscribes to its values and 
visions.129 The CCP as an updated version of the Leninist “vanguard” party130 
represents the interest of the Chinese people, acts as their “proxy” and in a “fiduciary 
capacity”,131 and discharges “pedagogical and tutelage responsibilities”.132  
 The theory of “state-party constitutionalism” is useful for the purpose of 
studying the evolution133 of a communist party-dominated political system that gives 
up totalitarianism, withdraws itself from the control of many sectors of the economy, 
society and culture, concedes a large space for private life and private pursuits, seeks 
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to regulate itself by the Rule of Law, and recognizes that citizens’ rights should be 
afforded legal protection. The concept of state-party constitutionalism shares some of 
the features of hybrid constitutionalism as discussed above, particularly in terms of 
the adherence to the Rule of Law and legal restrictions on civil liberties, but differs 
from hybrid constitutionalism in that it does not permit any space for opposition 
political parties and multiparty elections.  
Without such space, it may be questioned whether the portrayal of the role of the 
“party in power” in the theory of “state-party constitutionalism” is too idealized and 
too distant from the reality that despite the fact that the CCP has 89 million members 
today, its power is actually exercised by a small elite of Party leaders who are subject 
to little popular electoral accountability. The de facto lack of political citizenship on 
the part of the great majority of Chinese citizens as recognized by the theory also 
contradicts the text of the PRC Constitution itself, according to which all citizens have 
equal political rights. It is therefore doubtful whether this theory of state-party 
constitutionalism can fully legitimize the party-state itself.  
 Secondly, it may be queried whether the “separation of powers” between the 
CCP and state organs as identified by the theory is a sufficient separation of powers 
for the purpose of constitutionalism. It has been pointed out134 that the Chinese 
political system is characterised by a “dual normative system”,135 i.e. the 
“cohabitation of two normative systems”136 – the Party (CCP) system (comprising 
Party organs such as the Central Committee of the CCP, its Politburo and the 
Politburo Standing Committee) and the State system (comprising institutions such as 
the National People’s Congress, the State Council, courts and procuratorates). Among 
these two systems, only the State system is governed by the Constitution and laws of 
the People’s Republic of China, while the Party system is governed by the Party’s 
own constitution -- the Charter of the CCP -- and its internal regulations and rules. 
Yet Party leaders and organs participate actively in and selectively intervene in the 
decision-making processes of State organs,137 acting behind the scenes and not being 
subject to the State’s legal requirements of transparency and accountability or the 
possibility of being challenged in judicial review proceedings before the courts of the 
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State.138 Insofar as State organs are subject to the control and direction of Party 
organs, it may be doubted whether there is some kind of genuine separation of powers 
or checks and balances within the Chinese political system that the concept of 
constitutionalism implies.  
 Furthermore, the study of CCP leadership as a core element of China’s “living 
constitution”139 has shown that “there is no real division of power between the party 
and other state apparatuses. … there only exists division of labour. … There is no 
meaningful separation of power and independence among the state apparatuses and 
the party.”140 Neither is there a vertical separation of powers that constitutionalism in 
a large state usually entails. For example, even though in practice local governments 
enjoy considerable autonomy and some kind of “de facto fiscal federalism”141 exists 
in China today, there is no “political division of power” between local and central 
authorities in a “constitutional sense”.142 The general picture seems to be that State 
organs and citizens in practice enjoy considerable powers and rights on sufferance, 
without any secure constitutional or legal protection against intervention by Party 
authorities. The CCP not only “defines what power … state apparatuses may enjoy 
(content)”; “the CCP, as the ultimate decision-maker, decides which questions shall 
be decided by it (jurisdiction) and when it intervenes (timing)”.143 But insofar the 
Party chooses not to intervene, “there remains room for innovation, development and 
power advancement for other state apparatuses and citizens’ rights.”144  
 Thirdly, the theory of state-party constitutionalism in China is partly premised on 
the existence of the Rule of Law in China as a consequence of the development of the 
Chinese legal system in the last few decades. However, it may be queried whether, or 
to what extent, the Rule of Law exists in contemporary China. Critics and skeptics 
argue that despite the development of the Chinese legal system in the last few decades, 
China is at most practising or moving towards “Rule by Law”, rather than practising 
or moving towards genuine “Rule of Law”,145 because China is an authoritarian 
one-party state in which the supremacy of the CCP cannot be reconciled with or made 
compatible with genuine Rule of Law. 
In this regard, the distinction between law-based legitimacy and ideology-based 
legitimacy is noteworthy. In the history of the establishment of the PRC, “ideological 
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141 Ibid., at 86, 88. 
142 Ibid., at 87. 
143 Ibid., at 92. 
144 Ibid., at 92.  
145 See Peerenboom, China’s Long March (n 74) at 130-141, on “specifying the minimum conditions 
for rule of law” and how to distinguish between Rule of Law and mere rule by law. 
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commitment to socialism predates the constitutionalisation of the Chinese state”.146 
The legitimacy of rule by the CCP has been justified not by means of any 
constitutional document or constitutional mechanism or process, but by the ideology 
of Marxism-Leninism according to which the Communist Party, as vanguard of the 
proletariat, has the historical mission of leading the people in bringing about the 
revolution and in building a new socialist society.  
Thus in a communist party-state, the position of the Communist Party leadership 
“is legitimized by superior insight in the ultimate aim of history and the true interest 
of the people. The legitimation principle is not consensus of the people, but an 
absolute truth.”147 In a political system “legitimized by an absolute truth”,148 the 
constitution is subordinated to such truth.149 “The truth precedes the constitution and 
prevents it from being a comprehensive regulation of public power. The person or 
group of persons who embody or represent the truth, be it a priest or a group of 
clerics, be it a monarch or an avant-garde or a single political party that claims 
superior insight in the common best, remains above the constitution.” “Law, 
constitutional law included, is reduced to an instrumental role. It regulates, limits, and 
guides the behaviour of the individuals and the inferior agents of the political system, 
not its leadership.”150  
It is often said that in the PRC, the Constitution and the law are instruments of 
rule that add to the legitimacy of the party-state, but the Rule of Law is not realized. It 
has been suggested that the Chinese view -- or at least the CCP’s view -- of law is 
quite different from law as understood in the Western tradition. The CCP 
“understands law as a reflection of the party’s will and the people’s will and a form of 
the party’s and the people’s self-discipline.”151 The law does not “exist independently 
of politics.”152 According to this view, “[t]he socialist rule of law project is the 
party’s and the people’s effort to discipline themselves.”153 “[T]he party itself has 
never accepted the idea of the independent existence and supremacy of the 
constitution, … There is no subordination of the party to the constitution and the 
laws. … the party contends that it should, in a sense, stand above both. The party 
views itself as the guardian of the constitution and the laws, rather than just an 
ordinary political organization under the constitution. In the party’s words, ‘the 
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leadership of the party is the most essential trait of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics, and is the most fundamental guarantee for socialist rule of law’.”154  
 Hence it is argued that the nature and structural or systemic characteristics of the 
Party-State are such that, despite the considerable progress made in building a legal 
system in China in the post-Mao era, the Chinese legal system is not moving towards 
a system in which senior officials and top Party leaders who violate the law would be 
equally treated by the law and before the courts as others, and dissidents and others 
targeted by the regime would be accorded the same fair trials and due process that are 
accorded to others. In other words, even if China is making progress in extending 
some form of governance by law and adjudication in accordance with law in some 
domains of social and economic life, insofar as the Party reserves the right to 
intervene selectively in any “politically sensitive” matter or case relating to the 
Party’s important interests and in which the Party leadership considers it necessary, 
expedient or desirable to intervene, the system cannot be regarded or described as 
“Rule of Law”, because Rule of Law is the antithesis of arbitrary power.155 
  
 A move towards “socialist constitutionalism”?  The question thus arises of the 
compatibility between the Rule of Law (as an essential ingredient of “state-party 
constitutionalism” as discussed above) and the supremacy of CCP rule. In this regard, 
the discourse in China in recent years of “socialist constitutionalism”156 is instructive. 
A leading scholar who advocates “socialist constitutionalism” (shehuizhuyi xianzheng) 
is Tong Zhiwei.157 Unlike liberal scholars in China who do not agree that the 
monopoly of political power by the CCP is legitimate or should be given 
constitutional and legal recognition, Tong and other other adherents of “socialist 
constitutionalism” accept the political reality or even legitimacy of CCP rule in China, 
and seek to render it consistent with the Rule of Law or constitutionalism. Tong seeks 
to achieve this by proposing (a) to give constitutional and legal recognition to the 
ruling status of the CCP, and (b) to introduce and implement constitutional and legal 
norms that define the scope of the power of Party organs (including the respective 
boundaries of the power of State institutions and Party organs) and personnel and 
subject such power to precise legal control, regulation and supervision. Such legal 
norms are almost completely absent in the existing system.  
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 Tong’s proposals has not found favour with the authorities so far. Indeed, since 
2013, the very use of the term “constitutionalism” (xianzheng 宪政) in public 
discourse has been suppressed by the authorities.158 In the circle of intellectuals and 
writers, advocates of socialist constitutionalism were opposed by both liberals and 
conservatives. Liberals159 believe in liberal democracy and oppose the idea of 
enshrining one-party rule in the Constitution and codifying it in various laws. On the 
other hand, conservatives160 believe that the existing political system – as a 
component of the “China Model” -- has served China well, and there is no need to 
subject the Party to the legal norms of the State.  
 A notable development that offers hope from the perspective of advocates of 
socialist constitutionalism in China is that the decision of the 4th plenum of the 18th 
CCP Central Committee in 2014 on “ruling the country according to law”161 
advocated, inter alia, the strengthening of the system of rules and regulations 
governing the Party (“intra-Party regulations”),162 although there was no suggestion 
or intention to turn such rules and regulations into part of the laws and regulations of 
China’s legal system, which – unlike Party rules and regulations -- are all enacted in 
accordance with the norms and procedures prescribed by China’s Constitution and 
laws, publicly promulgated and enforceable before the courts of law. The plenum’s 
call for the strengthening or further development of the existing system of “intra-Party 
regulations” has generated a lively scholarly discourse on the significance and even 
constitutional implications of the development of “intra-Party regulations” as a 
normative system consisting of rules and regulations enacted by Party organs in 
accordance with the Charter of the CCP, existing side by side with the legal norms 
enacted by State organs (such as the National People’s Congress and its Standing 
Committee) in accordance with the Constitution of the PRC.163  
 A leading theorist of the possible direction of development of socialist 
constitutionalism in China is Ke Huaqing.164 He develops a typology of three forms 
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of constitutions or constitutionalism: constitutional monarchy; constitutional 
democracy; and constitutional Party leadership (lixian dangdao zhi, alternatively 
translated as “Party-led constitutional system”). In his view, the PRC is already 
practising a certain degree of constitutional Party leadership, but the political, 
constitutional and legal systems should be further developed and improved, so as to 
further institutionalize Party leadership, and to practise or constitutionalise more fully 
the system of constitutional Party leadership. This should be done by introducing a 
new chapter in the PRC Constitution that expressly provides for the leading status and 
role of the CCP (as a vanguard and progressive party representing the interests of the 
whole Chinese people), how it should perform its leadership functions, what powers it 
may exercise and how such powers may be exercised.  
 Ke describes the PRC constitutional system as a dual system based 
simultaneously on the PRC Constitution and the Charter of the CCP. He suggests that 
the constitutional and legal system of the PRC should evolve towards a threefold 
system consisting of (a) State laws, (b) intra-Party regulations and (c) laws and 
regulations on Party leadership (dangdao fagui 党导法规). As regards category (b), 
Ke considers that the rules and norms in the existing system of intra-Party regulations 
are less highly developed than the State laws of the PRC, and should therefore be 
further developed and strengthened in accordance with general premises of the Rule 
of Law. Furthermore, there should be an effective system to supervise the 
implementation of intra-Party regulations, including adjudicative bodies to apply and 
enforce the regulations in concrete cases.  
 Category (c) is a new concept invented by Ke. Whereas intra-Party regulations 
(category (b)) are made by Party organs and are only applicable to Party members and 
organs, category (c) consists of norms proposed by the CCP as Party policies or 
decisions but adopted by State organs such as the National People’s Congress and its 
Standing Committee, so that they are binding on all persons and institutions. The 
nature of category (c) norms is such that they serve as a bridge between State laws 
and intra-Party regulations, and facilitate or manifest the exercise of the leadership 
functions of the Party.  
 The decision in the 4th Plenum of 2014 to strengthen the system of intra-Party 
regulations suggests that it is possible that China will move in a direction closer to the 
kind of “constitutional Party leadership” envisaged by Ke.165 Such a move would 
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give greater credibility to the thesis that China is moving towards some form of 
“state-party constitutionalism”. Insofar as the essence of constitutionalism is, as 
suggested in part II of this chapter, the subjection of political power-holders to the 
governance of constitutional and legal rules, the system of “constitutional Party 
leadership” as theorized by Ke does seem to fulfil the core requirements of 
constitutionalism. 
 Ironically, any move of the Chinese party-state towards “constitutional Party 
leadership” or the kind of “communist/socialist constitutionalism” it embodies would 
mean a move in the opposite direction of liberal constitutionalism, and make it more 
difficult for China to achieve a gradual transition from the present system to a more 
liberal constitutionalism. Insofar as the constitutional and legal powers of the CCP are 
not formalized, institutionalized and fully legitimized and in the existing Constitution 
and laws of the PRC, the possibility exists, in both theory and practice, for more open 
and competitive elections to be introduced in the people’s congress system, for the 
constitutional powers of the people’s congresses and courts to be more actively 
exercised for the purpose of increasing the degree of accountability of officials and 
power-holders, and for a greater degree of freedom of speech and association to be 
allowed in the public sphere and civil society. There is little in the texts of the existing 
PRC Constitution and laws that prohibits or disallows such developments. The 
paradox therefore is that while it may doubted whether the existing 
political-constitutional-legal practices in the PRC meet the requirements of 
constitutionalism as constitutional and legal restraint on the exercise of State power 
and the subjection of political power-holders to the governance of constitutional and 
legal norms, a movement in the future towards a higher degree of constitutionalism – 
in the form of “socialist constitutionalism” or “constitutional Party leadership” – 
would take China further away from liberal constitutionalism.   
 
V. Conclusion 
 This chapter has reviewed the development of the practice of adoption of written 
constitutions by states in the modern era, and discussed the global spread of such 
practice from Europe and North America to other parts of the world. It has considered 
the classifications or typology of constitutions and constitutionalism. It has examined 
the case of modern China from the perspective of constitutions and constitutionalism. 
The case of China offers much food for thought as we ponder the significance of 
written constitutions and the meaning of constitutionalism.  
 Learning from Western and Japanese constitutional models, the imperial 
government of the Qing Empire in the first decade of the 20th century sought to move 
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China in the direction of a constitutional monarchy. The plan did not materialize as 
Qing rule was overthrown by the 1911 Revolution which established the Republic of 
China. Experiments in constitution-making in the first decade of the republican era 
failed to produce any effective or stable constitution. The government established by 
the Kuomintang (KMT) in the late 1920’s subscribed to a three-stage process of 
state-building: military rule; political tutelage (by the KMT); constitutional 
government (or constitutionalism). The Constitution of the Republic of China (RoC) 
adopted in late 1946, which was liberal-democratic in orientation, was supposed to 
inaugurate the era of constitutionalism in China. However, the Chinese Civil War of 
the late 1940’s resulted in the KMT regime being driven to Taiwan where it imposed 
authoritarian rule. The liberal democratic promises of the RoC Constitution were only 
fulfilled after the KMT regime embarked upon liberalization and democratization by 
lifting martial law in 1987. Using the typology of constitutionalism developed earlier 
in this chapter, Taiwan was a case of “hybrid constitutionalism” subsequently moving 
towards liberal constitutionalism.     
 In mainland China, the establishment of the PRC by the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) in 1949 inaugurated a new era of constitution-making. Whereas the first 
constitution, enacted in 1954, largely followed the constitutional model provided by 
the Soviet Union, the constitution was blatantly disregarded in the Cultural 
Revolution era. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping launched the new policy of “reform and 
opening” and building a “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, which included the 
reconstruction of the constitutional and legal systems. The progress made in 
developing the “socialist market economy” and the “socialist legal system with 
Chinese characteristics” raises the question of whether the PRC is practising or 
moving towards some form of “state-party constitutionalism”.  
 The case of contemporary China thus poses the fundamental question of what is 
constitutionalism and how contemporary China should be located within a typology of 
constitutions or constitutionalism. This chapter suggests that the core requirement of 
constitutionalism is the subjection of power-holders to the governance of 
constitutional and legal norms. Whether constitutionalism is realised in a particular 
State at a particular time is a matter of degree. Constitutionalism is more fully realized 
where power-holders adopt the “internal point of view” (in H.L.A. Hart’s words) 
towards constitutional and legal norms, where multiple powers check and balance one 
another, or where independent courts adjudicate on whether constitutional and legal 
norms have been complied with. Thus the Rule of Law is an indispensable ingredient 
of constitutionalism. 
 Insofar as the supreme power of the CCP has not been fully subordinated to the 
Rule of Law, it may be doubted whether constitutionalism – at least in the form of 
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“state-party constitutionalism” -- is currently practised in China. However, theories 
propounded by scholars such as Tong Zhiwei and Ke Huaqing, if implemented, would 
bring China closer to some kind of constitutionalism, such as “socialist 
constitutionalism” as theorized by Tong or “constitutional Party leadership” as 
theorized by Ke. Ironically, a move of China towards constitutionalism of the kind 
envisaged by Tong and Ke would take China further away from liberal 
constitutionalism, and probably make a gradual transition to liberal constitutionalism 
in the future more difficult.    
